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Since 1992, the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) has published cardiac
care report cards for coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery providers. We examine the impact
of CABG report cards on a provider's aggregate volume and volume by patient severity and then employ
a mixed logit model to investigate the matching between patients and providers. We find a reduction
in volume of poor performing and unrated surgeons' volume but no effect on more highly rated surgeons
or hospitals of any rating. We also find that the probability that patients, regardless of severity of illness,
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Public disclosure of the performance of health care providers (e.g. hospitals and 
physicians) – often referred to as report cards – has been increasing since the early 1990's. In 
many states, these report cards rate providers on the performance of a particular procedure, most 
often reporting whether they had high, normal, or low risk adjusted mortality rates relative to the 
expected rates given the health characteristics of the patient population.
1
 The agencies and 
regulators responsible for the provision of this public information often claim improved quality 
and efficiency in the provision of care as the main goal of providing this information.
2
 Despite 
the economic undertone of this claim and the high level of attention paid by the medical and 
public health literature to this phenomenon,
3
 only recently has the public disclosure of the 
performance of health care providers become the subject of published research among 
economists (Cutler, Huckman and Landrum 2004; Dranove, McClellan and Satterwaite 2003; 
Dranove and Sfekas 2008; Bundorf, Chun, Goda and Kessler 2009).
4  
Because of the highly specialized nature of health care, there exists an asymmetry of 
information related to the quality of the health care provider (Arrow 1963). By providing public 
information on the relative performance of providers, a regulator or public agency can increase 
the ability of patients, referring physicians, and health insurance plan providers to distinguish 
and select providers of high quality, thereby improving the health outcomes of those using the 
services provided in the health care market. This information may also ensure accountability of 
                                                 
1 For example, Shearer and Cronin (2005) alone reviewed 51 online hospital performance reporting. 
2 As recommended by the Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, Institute of Medicine (2001), for 
example, "making the information describing the health care system's performance, evidence-based practice and 
patient satisfaction" transparent is an important step as we move to the 21st-century health care system. 
3 See detailed reviews in Epstein (2006) and Marshall et al. (2000). 
4 The impact of public disclosure of health plan performance has received as much, if not more, attention 
in recent economics literature (Beaulieu 2002; Dafny and Dranove 2008; Jin and Sorensen 2005; Chernew, 
Gowrisankaran and Scanlon 2008; Wedig and Tai-Seale 2002). 
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health care providers in the promotion of quality improvements and has the potential to increase 
efficiency and increase total welfare. 
Welfare increases may not occur uniformly across different patient subpopulations as a 
result of public reporting. In fact, they may not even increase at all.  In health care, particularly 
surgery which sometimes needs to be consumed with little advanced notice, the quality of and 
distance to the provider become the main choice variables. Those with more severe disease or in 
emergent condition may not have the time or ability to access the public information. Because 
those with less severe non-emergent disease can use the information to select the best providers, 
this could leave them unavailable to treat the patients who would arguably benefit more from the 
comparatively better performance of these surgeons. Thus report cards could increase market 
concentration for the particular procedure in a way that makes it more difficult for the neediest 
patients to access better providers. 
Another effect public disclosure has on public welfare is related to the incentive this 
information gives providers to game the system. While relatively healthier patients may sort to 
better providers, this sorting may be further exacerbated by providers’ efforts to improve or 
maintain quality ratings.  Report cards might lead to patient selection or patient dumping, 
phenomena which have previously been documented (Ellis 1998; Dranove et al. 2003). In 
practice, providers often claim that the risk adjustment measures used in the calculations for the 
report cards fail to capture all the necessary information.
5
 If providers are convinced that sicker 
patients raise the probability of having a poor rating and are convinced that poor ratings will lead 
to a decrease in demand for their service or potential sanctions by the regulator, they may select 
                                                 
5 As a condition of reporting data to the state agency in Pennsylvania, hospitals are allowed to respond to the release 
of report cards in a public fashion with the results being posted on the website where the report cards are found. It 
appears as though hospitals ranked as poor performers will often point out that there is some facet of the system that 
fails to account for the poor health of their particular patients. 3 
 
only the relatively healthy patients for the procedures which have publicly reported performance 
measures to reduce their likelihood of receiving poor rankings.  This behavior would also 
constrain sicker patients’ access to better providers, assuming the better providers are the ones 
able to select the risk profile of their patients. 
Much of the previous literature also ignores the interaction between hospital and surgeon 
report cards and fails to account for hospital proximity to patient’s residence.
6  Low performing 
hospitals may have surgeons who are rated proficient or high performing and vice versa.  For 
those who are quite ill, hospital quality may not be as important as proximity to one’s residence.  
If one expects to be hospitalized for a long period of time, proximity to family support networks 
may be important, and being farther away from home would raise the cost of this support.
7  In 
emergent cases this distance-to-hospital issue is even more salient, and report cards would be an 
even more minor factor in the hospital choice decision.  However, in both cases the selection of 
surgeon might still be based on report cards conditional on arriving at a given hospital.  In either 
case it is likely not the patient using the information first hand, rather a cardiologist (in the non-
emergent cases) or the attending physician (in emergent cases) who use the report card 
information for referral purposes.  Indeed, for hospitals receiving emergent cases, it is in their 
interest that these cases be steered toward better performing surgeons, as the hospital report card 
is composed of operations performed by each of the surgeries performed in that facility.  
In this paper, we use more recent data (1998-2005) from Pennsylvania along with the 
publication of surgeon and hospital coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) performance data, 
                                                 
6 Kessler (2005) proposed an alternative approach to rank hospitals on the basis of the travel distances of their 
Medicare patients. This hypothetical distance-based report card is more powerful than the outcome-based report card 
to distinguish high-mortality hospitals from the average hospital, but less powerful at distinguishing low-mortality 
hospitals from the average hospital. 
7 If one elects to get treated at a hospital further from their home then relatives and friends involved in supporting 
them during the procedure and recovery would need to travel further, potentially rent hotel rooms, take even more 
additional time off work than they otherwise would if the facility was local, etc. 4 
 
collected by an independent state agency, the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment 
Council (PHC4), to address two questions about the effects of quality reporting. First, we 
examine the effects report cards have on the patient volumes of hospitals and cardiac surgeons 
separately. We aggregate the patient-level data into hospital-quarter or surgeon-quarter, and use 
hospital or surgeon fixed effects to remove unobserved variations that are correlated with both 
ratings and volumes. The expectation is that patients', referring physicians', and/or health 
insurance plan providers' response to the information provided in the report cards will be 
observable through changes in patient volumes upon release of new information. 
On the demand side, demand could decrease for poor performing surgeons, increase for 
high performing surgeons, or some combination thereof. On the supply side, poor-performing 
surgeons could change their patient selection decisions after learning their relative performance, 
perhaps voluntarily or as the result of administrative changes (Epstein 2006). The equilibrium 
volume will change in response to changes in demand-side factors, supply-side factors, or both. 
Moreover, we expect a surgeon's volume to be more responsive to the reported rating than 
hospital volume, because there are more surgeons in the market and the demand for surgeons' 
services will be more elastic than the demand for hospital services.
8 Our empirical results 
confirm this expectation. 
Second, we examine the matching between patients and surgeons. If it is more beneficial 
for sicker patients to receive treatment from high-quality surgeons and if high-quality surgeons 
are less likely to shun sicker patients, then report cards will improve the social welfare by 
promoting better matching between patients and surgeons. We first follow Cutler et al. (2004) 
                                                 
8 Again this is because conditional upon going to a particular facility the cost of choosing a particular surgeon that is 
at that hospital is only the cost of information, which is likely to be acquired and processed by the rest of the staff 
who can ‘steer’ patients toward better surgeons.  There is no evidence of excessive wait times for CABG in PA 
during this period.  There was an overall declining demand for CABG due to the diffusion of PTCA as a substitute 
revascularization procedure (Cutler and Huckman, 2003). 5 
 
and examine surgical volumes at hospital or surgeon level by patient severity , so we can 
examine whether report cards have heterogeneous impacts on patients of different severity 
ratings. 
However, there are two empirical problems which arise in this type of aggregate level 
analysis. The primary concern is that aggregate level analysis does not take patient heterogeneity 
into consideration. A secondary empirical concern, particularly for the surgeon-level analysis, is 
that the data constitute an unbalanced panel, which itself is probably due to non-random factors 
including exit of surgeons attributable to poor ratings. To address these concerns, we use a mixed 
logit model at the individual patient level to examine responses of patients with different severity 
ratings and emergent status to low-performing surgeons. 
Overall, we find that surgical volume is negatively associated with surgeons' receiving a 
poor rating or being unrated, regardless of patient severity. We also find that the probability that 
patients, regardless of severity of illness, receive treatment from low-performing surgeons is 
significantly lower. The implication of these findings is that patients or referring physicians are 
aware of the report card publication and use the information to select high-quality providers, or 
alternatively stated, avoid low-performing or unrated providers. However, volumes of both types 
of patients respond similarly, which suggests report cards did not lead to an improvement in the 
matching process and excessively high demand for top surgeons, who it might be argued that 






2 Institutional Background and Previous Literature 
2.1 Institutional Background 
Health outcomes report cards are one mechanism by which health care provider quality 
information is disseminated to the public. Health outcomes report cards usually provide 
information related to adverse health outcomes, such as mortality rates and complications rates, 
at the provider- or plan-level, often for a specific procedure or treatment of a specific disease. 
Among the provider-level, procedure-specific category, CABG report cards are the most well-
established, and New York and Pennsylvania were the first two states to make these publicly 
available (in 1990 and 1992, respectively). Although most states collect health care services data, 
to our knowledge only California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Virginia followed in the 
footsteps of New York and Pennsylvania to create similar reporting systems to publicly disclose 
the performance of CABG providers. 
The Pennsylvania's Guide to Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery (i.e., report card) is 
published by the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4). The report cards 
publicly disclose the aggregate health outcomes of those undergoing CABG at the hospital- and 
surgeon-level. Since 1992, PHC4 has published ten CABG report cards (for the years 1990, 
1991, 1992, 1993, 1994/1995, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005).
9 Prior to 1998, the report 
cards were distributed to hospitals, surgeons, public libraries, business groups, legislature, the 
media, and any individual who requested them (Schneider and Epstein 1998). Beginning in 1998, 
PHC4 posted the 1994/95 and all subsequent report cards on the agency web site, making reports 
                                                 
9 Reports cards are available at http://www.phc4.org. The report cards, with the exception of those for the years 
1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993, are available at PHC4's website. 7 
 
more accessible to health care consumers and their physicians. Report card data collection and 
publication dates are summarized in Table 1. 
Providers are only given a report card if they meet the minimum volume threshold for the 
rating year, which is at least 30 CABG procedures performed. The report cards rate CABG 
providers (hospitals and surgeons) on four outcomes: in-hospital mortality, 30-day mortality, 7-
day readmission and 30-day readmission. To arrive at the rating for each provider, PHC4 first 
constructs a 95% confidence interval for the expected risk-adjusted rate for each of the four 
outcomes, and compares the actual outcomes of each provider to the 95% confidence interval. 
Each hospital and surgeon receives one of three possible ratings: lower than expected, same-as-
expected, or higher than expected in each of the four categories. The report cards also publish the 
average post-surgical length of stay for the patients of each hospital and each surgeon. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Over the last two decades, CABG mortality rates have been declining nationwide and 
research indicates public dissemination of provider report cards has accelerated this trend.
10 
Epstein (2006) outlined three possible mechanisms through which CABG provider report cards 
would lead to reductions in mortality: changes in the population of patients, changes in the 
population of CABG providers, and better matching between patients and providers. However, 
empirical results are mixed on the mechanisms through which report cards improve patients' 
health outcomes. 
New York has the longest history of publishing outcome information related to CABG, 
which is done through the New York Cardiac Surgeon Reporting System (CSRS). As a result, a 
large proportion of the empirical literature on the subject of report cards employs these data. The 
                                                 
10 See Hannan et al. (1994) and Peterson et al. (1998). 8 
 
CSRS is similar to the reporting system in Pennsylvania, disclosing health outcomes and 
provider ratings at the hospital- and surgeon-level. Using New York data from 1991 to 1999, 
Cutler et al. (2004) found that hospitals identified by a public report card as having high-
mortality in the past 12 months experience a 10% decline in monthly CABG volume, but found 
no evidence that report cards had a significant increase on volume for low-mortality (high 
performing) hospitals. By examining patient characteristics, the authors determined that most of 
the decline in volume of hospitals receiving poor grades was due to the loss of relatively healthy 
(low-severity) patients. They attribute this to the healthier patients having lower search costs and 
having the ability to afford avoiding low-quality hospitals. The main limitation of this study is 
that it was focused on hospital-level analysis. As such, the model controlled only hospital fixed 
effects and year fixed effects and did not address surgeon-level effects. 
Using New York Data from 1990 to 1993, Mukamel and Mushlin (1998) found that 
hospitals and surgeons with lower reported mortality rates experienced higher rates of annual 
growth in Medicare market shares. They also found that surgeons with lower reported mortality 
rates had higher rates of annual growth in prices charged submitted to Medicare for CABG 
surgery. Using New York Data from 1992 to 1995 Romano and Zhou (2004) found that hospitals 
with low mortality had a 22% increase in CABG volume in the first month after report cards 
were released, whereas hospitals with high mortality had a 16% decrease in CABG volume in the 
second month after report cards were released. 
Other studies suggest that CABG report cards change the population of patients and 
improve the matching between elderly patients and providers. Schneider and Epstein (1996) 
randomly surveyed 50 percent of cardiologists and cardiac surgeons in Pennsylvania in 1995. 
They reported that 59 percent of cardiologists found it more difficult to place patients who were 9 
 
severely ill and required CABG, and that 63 percent of cardiac surgeons were less willing to 
perform CABG on severely ill patients. Using Medicare claim data from 1987 to 1994,
11 
Dranove et al. (2003) found that the illness severity of elderly CABG patients in NY and PA 
declined compared to states which had not introduced public report cards before or during this 
period.
12 Their study provides evidence of selection behavior of CABG providers and suggests 
that, at least in the short term, the population of elderly CABG patients changed for Medicare 
beneficiaries. They also found that teaching hospitals in NY and PA experienced a greater share 
of severely ill patients, and that report cards led to delays of getting treatments for both healthy 
and sick patients. The authors conclude that report card publication led to better matching 
between patients and providers because teaching status is an indication of quality and the process 
of better matching is likely to take time. 
However, the authors' argument that report cards led to better matching between patients 
and providers is based on inference rather than direct testing by incorporation of the information 
provided by the report cards, such as providers' ratings, into the model. In order to fully 
understand the impact of the report cards on the market equilibrium, one would need to examine 
the within-state impacts of the report cards of individual hospitals and surgeons. It also would be 
useful to incorporate non-Medicare and Medicaid patients, as they are usually younger, into the 
analysis. The reason for this is that if younger patients have a different likelihood of being aware 
                                                 
11 During the period, only NY and PA have CABG report cards. NY's first CABG report card was published in 1991 
and PA's first CABG report card was published in 1992. 
12 The illness severity measures used are the mean of patients' total hospital expenditures one year prior to admission 
and the mean of patients' total days in hospital one year prior to admission. While there is some correlation between 
recent spending and latent health status, there are a moderate number of very serious coronary artery disease cases 
that are managed and treated on an outpatient basis or not detected by health providers at all until sudden onset of 
AMI. Also, those who have had more recent hospital stays potentially could have a higher rate of hospital resource 
use and even improved their health status by using this resource prior to having CABG relative to resource non-
users, further complicating the use of this as a measure of latent health status at the time of the decision of whether a 
patient will undergo CABG. 10 
 
or using the report cards, or if the search and treatment costs are systematically different, then 
publicly provided information may have a differential impact on the younger population. 
Overall, the literature on the impacts of report cards focuses generally on the effects of 
the information in the early 1990's and most often only deals with the effect they have 
immediately after introduction. The ability of patients, their primary providers, and their family 
to access, understand and effectively employ report cards in their decision making has changed 
drastically since the early 1990's, given the rapid diffusion of internet use during this period and 
that the reports in PA were not specifically published on the internet until 1998. Moreover, the 
diffusion of Percutaneous Coronary Intervention (PCI) as a substitute for CABG occurred quite 
rapidly in the mid 1990's, which may have changed the overall patient population receiving 
CABG (Cutler and Huckman 2003). Further investigation into the impacts of report cards in 
more recent periods is warranted. 
 
3 Data and Sample 
3.1 Data 
We employed four different datasets in this study. The primary data are the Pennsylvania 
Inpatient Hospital Discharge Data collected by PHC4. In order to maintain consistency of this 
administrative dataset and to meet state requirements, Pennsylvania general acute care hospitals 
are required to use a uniform claims and billing form (UB92) to submit their data. This dataset 
contains very rich clinical and utilization information at the patient-level. Data elements include 
patients' race/ethnicity, gender, age, zip code of residence, severity of illness, insurance type, the 
type of admission, the quarter of admission, the principal diagnosis code and secondary 11 
 
diagnoses codes, the principal procedure code and secondary procedure codes, discharge status, a 
four-digit unique facility identifier, and the license number of the operating physician. 
Pennsylvania hospitals use the computerized system MedisGroups to calculate the 
severity measure. This measure is calculated using clinical variables such as physician 
examinations, radiology findings, laboratory findings, and pathology findings.
13
 Therefore, this 
measure is an independent proxy for patient severity upon admission. The patient severity is a 
score from 0 to 4. A higher score indicates a greater likelihood of in-hospital death (Iezzoni and 
Moskowitz 1988). The average severity of illness of patients in our sample is 1.5. Thus, we 
define low severity as a score of 0 or 1, and high severity as a score of 2, 3 or 4. Procedure codes, 
identified by International Classification of Disease, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-
9-CM) codes, enable us to define our CABG sample. The unique facility identifier enables us to 
identify at which hospital the patient underwent CABG surgery. The license number of the 
operating physician allows us to identify the surgeon who performed the operation on the patient.  
The second dataset we use in our study is the Pennsylvania's Guide to Coronary Artery 
Bypass Graft Surgery, which we refer to as report cards. Because in-hospital mortality is a 
general indicator of surgical outcomes and PHC4 has consistently reported the in-hospital 
mortality ratings at hospital- and surgeon-level, we use provider's in-hospital mortality ratings as 
a quality measure. For each patient that underwent CABG surgery in our study period, we match 
the in-hospital mortality rating in the most recent report card of each patient's hospital and 
surgeon to the patient's individual-level data. The report card publication date and each patient's 
admission year and quarter allow us to identify the most recent rating for each patient's 
providers. 
                                                 
13 See Iezzoni et al. (1996) for more detailed descriptions. 12 
 
Our third data source is the web site of the Pennsylvania Department of State Bureau of 
Professional and Occupational Affairs. This web site allows us to extract the name and license 
issue date for CABG surgeons who have performed surgery in PA. The primary dataset contains 
only the surgeon's license number, and the report card lists only the surgeon's name, so this data 
set allows us to link a surgeon's license number with his/her name and thus combine the first two 
datasets. Additionally, we are able to construct the surgeon's experience given the surgeon's 
license issue date, and use the patient's admission year to control for surgeon heterogeneity in 
our models.
14 Finally, hospital characteristics were taken from our fourth data source, the 
American Hospital Association's Annual Survey of Hospitals. 
3.2 Sample 
Our study sample includes Pennsylvania residents (aged 30 and above) who were 
undergoing an isolated CABG procedure (CABG surgery with no other major heart surgery 
during the same admission)
15
 in Pennsylvania hospitals and who were admitted between the third 
quarter of 1998 and the first quarter of 2006 (N=127,285). We drop patients whose admitting 
hospital performed fewer than 30 CABG surgeries in the reporting year and were thus not rated 
in the most recent report cards (N=12,099). Our final sample consists of 114,039 CABG patients 
without missing values, and 84,235 CABG patients if unrated surgeons are excluded. The 
location of hospitals providing CABG in our sample is shown in Figure 1. 
There are two important reasons that we focus on the report cards that were published 
after 1998. First, report card information was made available online after the 1998 publication. 
                                                 
14 There is some assumption that the license date corresponds with the beginning of the surgeon's career. This may 
not hold for all surgeons, particularly if they have moved from outside the mid-Atlantic region, as surgeons not 
practicing in states immediately adjacent to PA would not have reason to hold a PA license. Thus, our experience 
variables contain some measurement errors. 
15 For example, as discussed in Shahian et al. (2001), additional procedures are given at the same time as the CABG 
surgery, such as mitral valve repair, atrial septal defect repair or left ventricular aneurysmectomy, these cases are not 
classified as isolated CABG's and are not included in reporting. 13 
 
Most previous studies found that earlier report card publications in Pennsylvania had no impact 
on hospital volumes. We expect that the availability of the report card information online may 
increase their impact on patients, referring physicians, health plan providers, hospitals, and 
cardiac surgeons. Second, the Certificate of Need (CON) regulation for cardiac care was 
terminated in 1996. In the three years prior to the termination of CON in Pennsylvania, 1994-
1996, the number of open-heart surgery programs was stable (from 43 to 44). In contrast, the 
number of programs climbed from 44 to 55 in the three years following CON termination 
(Robinson, Nash, Moxey and O'Connor 2001). Although the CON had no significant impact on 
inpatient mortality rates for CABG (Robinson et al. 2001), it did decrease the average procedure 
volume for CABG, and the average cost per CABG patient (Ho 2006). These trends became 
relatively more stable after 1998. Thus, we concentrate on the four most recent report cards to 
eliminate the confounding factors due to movement to online provision and the repeal of CON 
regulation. 
In Table 2, we list the number of hospitals and surgeons by ratings across four report card 
episodes, as well as the sample years that are attached to each report card. Overall, we have more 
CABG hospitals and fewer CABG surgeons over time. The number of hospitals with high 
mortality flags fluctuates while the number of surgeons with high mortality flags decreases 
between 1994 and 2003. The reduction of surgeons is largely due to the reduction of unrated 
surgeons. Between reports of 1994 and 2003, the number of CABG surgeons decreased from 518 
to 221, and the reduction of unrated surgeons accounts for 97% of the reduction. 
One might argue that the reduction of CABG surgeons is not purely due to the 
publication of report cards. Another compelling reason to explain this trend is technological 
substitution: more patients undergoing percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) rather than 14 
 
CABG. Indeed, Cutler and Huckman (2003) show that the substitution of PCI for CABG occurs 
over time, with much of the substitution effect occurring in the 1990's. Understanding the causal 
impact of report card on the patterns in the decreasing number of surgeons, particularly the 
unrated surgeons, is important, but is left for future research. To fully address the question we 
are addressing here, we keep those unrated surgeons in our sample in order to have a complete 
sample of rated hospitals, because a hospital may be rated even if some or all of its' affiliated 
surgeons are not. 
Table 3 contains the summary statistics of in-patient discharge data for CABG patients. 
In both samples, about 2% of patients died in-hospital. 7% of patients were admitted to hospitals 
with high mortality risk flags, while 10% of patients had hospitals with low mortality risk flags. 
Four to six percents of patients received CABG from surgeons with high mortality flags, while 2-
3% of patients received their surgeries from surgeons with low mortality flags. 28% of patients 
received CABG surgeries from unrated surgeons.
16  
4 Conceptual Framework 
4.1 Supply   
On the supply side, the health economics literature typically assumes that physicians 
maximize their expected profit by choosing quantity and price (summarized in McGuire (2000)). 
Physicians, as well as hospitals may have different responses to the potential effects of report 
cards on the future demand for their services and future income. 
                                                 
16 Our patient composition is as follows. Respectively, 86.5%, 0.3%, 3.3%, and 9.9% of the patients are white, 
Asian, black, and other races. 70% are male patients. 2.7% of the patients are 30 to 44 years old, 38.4% are 45 to 64 
years old, and 58.9% are at least 65 years old. The average severity of illness of all patients is 1.5. 33.1% are 
emergency cases. Uninsured, private insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid patients make up 0.8%, 38.3%, 53.6%, and 
3.9% respectively.  15 
 
One potential response is to engage in up-coding. Strictly defined, up-coding occurs 
when a provider increases a patient's recorded severity so that the provider can get reimbursed at 
a higher rate from the insurer. Analogous to up-coding for increased reimbursement, up-coding 
for a better ‘grade’ may be an issue, as the increase of a patients’ severity changes the risk-
adjusted mortality calculations in a way that would be potentially favorable for a surgeon’s (or 
hospital’s) rating. For example, when the CABG report cards were first introduced in New York, 
Green and Wintfield (1995) found a significant increase in the prevalence of five comorbidities, 
which accounted for 41 percent of the decrease in risk-adjusted mortality. While the empirical 
evidence is still unclear about whether or not public reporting induces true up-coding behavior, 
or simply induces more accurate coding, the former is nonetheless a possible gaming response by 
providers.  We argue, however, that any trend toward up-coding would have occurred during the 
initial transitions to the report card market environment and led to a new equilibrium level of 
coding intensity.
17  Therefore, our examination of the impact of the latter years’ report cards 
provides some insight into the effects they have net of this up-coding behavior. 
Second, providers may engage in patient selection. While formal patient dumping at the 
hospital-level is difficult given the regulatory environment, surgeons have more freedom whether 
to accept a patient. Patient selection in this setting will occur when surgeons avoid operating 
sicker patients who they perceive as having a "true" probability of dying that exceeds the 
expected risk-adjusted mortality probability. The reason the providers would avoid these patients 
is the belief that these patients could disproportionately hurt their reputation via a poor rating on 
a report card. 
                                                 
17 There is a trade-off in risk between the additional payment and improvement of report cards gained and the risk 
of additional scrutiny up-coding may draw from payers.  While we do not deal with it explicitly here, profit-
maximization theory would suggest transition to a new equilibrium level of coding intensity would happen quickly. 16 
 
Third, report card publication may change a surgeon's willingness to offer CABG at all. 
Poor performing surgeons practicing in states with report cards systems in place may switch to 
other specialties or exit the market either by retiring early or moving to states without a publicly 
reported performance system. Chassin (2002) and Hannan et al. (1995) found that 27 low-
volume, high-mortality surgeons exited the New York market or switched to performing other 
surgery. In summary, these actions by surgeons are all theoretical possibilities, while actually 
determining whether the report card publication has any impact on the market remains an 
empirical question. 
As for hospitals, given that more than 60 percent of hospitals nationally are not-for-profit, 
economists typically assume that hospitals maximize an objective function with different 
maximands, such as quality and quantity, rather than using a traditional profit maximization 
condition. This objective function is subject to a break-even budget constraint which assumes 
that the equity capital has been obtained through philanthropic donations, debt, and retained 
earnings (Newhouse 1970; Frank and Salkever 1991). In recent literature
18, empirical studies 
have suggested that not-for-profit hospitals are similar to for-profit hospitals in terms of quality 
of care, prices, uncompensated care provisions, technology adoption, etc. 
Regardless of their objectives, hospital administrators may respond to report cards similar 
to the way surgeons respond. Hospital managers may encourage up-coding, may restrict sicker 
patients from being considered eligible for the rated procedure, may allocate fewer patients to 
poor-performing surgeons, or may revoke the admitting privileges of poor-rated surgeons. 
Differentiating between these potential explanations, while interesting and important, requires 
more detailed data than we had at our disposal and is therefore left to future research; here we are 
focused on whether there is an observable impact of report cards on procedure volume. 
                                                 
18 See a comprehensive review in Sloan (2000). 17 
 
4.2 Demand 
  On the demand side, when a patient becomes ill, the patient and his/her cardiologist may 
jointly determine where and from whom to have the CABG surgery.
 19 Patients' utility function  
depends on both observable and unobservable consumer and providers' characteristics. Suppose 
the indirect utility that patient i (=1, 2, ..., N) derives from receiving CABG surgery from 
surgeon k at hospital j is  jik U , which is a function of patient's characteristics, report card ratings 
and exogenous variables such as the distance between a patient's residence and the chosen 
hospital. The patient chooses the hospital and the surgeon pair with the greatest indirect utility. 
If demanders of surgery respond to the information provided in the report cards, we can 
expect patients will choose high quality providers and avoid low quality providers. Sicker 
patients may be more likely to choose better surgeons because they have more to gain by doing 
so. On the other hand, relatively healthier patients may also be more likely to choose better 




We address in this paper two potential effects of public reporting of provider quality 
information: the impact of report cards on the patient volume of providers and the impact report 
cards have on patient matching. In our empirical specifications described in the next section, we 
first perform the analysis at hospital- and surgeon-levels, and then focus on the patient-level 
hospital-surgeon choice.  It is important to point out that our analyses do not distinguish whether 
                                                 
19 In cases where a patient is admitted in an emergency situation, the choice is determined by the patient and 
possibly family and friends. This may be done after brief consultation with emergency responders, but that is 
inconsequential to the analysis at hand. 
20 This choice may not be made by the patient alone. It could be done in consultation with their primary care 
provider, referring cardiologist and family, but it is a choice nonetheless, and the exact people involved in helping in 
this choice does not matter given the primary aim of this model. 18 
 
the volume change or hospital-surgeon choice is due to demand- or supply-side factors. The 
equilibrium volumes or patient's final choice may change, due to the report card publication, in 
response to the change of demand-side factors, supply-side factors, or both. 
In the patient-level analysis, supply-side factors will enter the choice model through the 
changing choice set of the patients. The choice set will change as a result of new information. 
Poor performing surgeons may exit the market by retiring earlier, relocating to other states 
without public reporting, or switching to types of surgery in which outcomes are not publicly 
reported. Alternatively, they may be forcibly selected out of the market by health plans that drop 
them or by hospitals revoking or constraining admitting privileges. Thus, the supply side 
responds to the information, and the choice set for each patient and referring cardiologist will 
change. The potential patient selection of health care providers will also affect patient's final 
choice of hospital/surgeon. 
5 Empirical Specification 
5.1 Hospital-Level and Surgeon-Level Volume Analysis 
To identify the effects of report cards on hospital-level and surgeon-level volumes, we 
take advantage of the panel structure of the data. Unobserved providers' quality may affect both 
ratings and volumes, which confounds the causal impacts of report cards. For example, providers 
with better unobserved quality may attract higher volumes because of word-of-mouth or formal 
referral, which could result in better health outcomes either because they are better quality 
providers or through the volume-outcome relationship. Alternatively, providers with poor 
unobserved quality may manipulate both ratings and volumes by up-coding or cherry picking. As 
a result, cross-sectional analyses that rely on rating variations across the providers will yield 
biased results. Our identification strategy is to employ the hospital or surgeon fixed effects that 19 
 
exploit the variation within the hospital or surgeon. By removing the time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity with fixed effects, we will be able to identify the causal impact of ratings on 
volumes. 
To test the effects of report cards on hospital-level volume, we use the number of CABG 
procedures performed in a hospital in a quarter as the dependent variable.
21
 We estimate the 
following regression 
                                                         ,           1  
where j indexes hospital, q indexes quarter of hospital admission (q = 1, … , 31; from the third 
quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2006), and t indexes year of hospital admission. 
The first independent variable of interest is a dummy variable indicating whether the hospital 
received a high in-hospital mortality flag (Highjq) in the most recent report card prior to 
performing the CABG surgery.
22
  The coefficient α1  is expected to be negative, i.e. hospitals 
flagged with high mortality perform fewer procedures relative to their counterparts. 
The second independent variable of interest is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
hospital received a low in-hospital mortality flag (Lowjq) in the most recent report card prior to 
performing the CABG surgery. We expect α2 to be positive, i.e. hospitals flagged with low 
mortality perform more procedures relative to their counterparts. Both of the dummies measure 
the impact relatively to the excluded group, which consists of hospitals whose in-hospital 
mortality ratings are same-as-expected, i.e. their actual mortality rates inside the 95% confidence 
interval. Hospital characteristics Hij  include ownership types, bed size, and teaching status, δt  is 
a vector of time fixed effects, and γj   is a vector of hospital fixed effects. 
                                                 
21 To simplify our notations, we drop the subscript of severity s hereafter. However, we will perform the empirical 
analyses by patients' severity of illness. 
22 Cutler et al. (2004) did not find that the presence of any residual effect on volume of being poorly rated on the 
older report cards: it was only the most recent report card that mattered. 20 
 
We estimate a similar regression using the number of CABG procedures performed by a 
surgeon in a quarter as the dependent variable to test the effects of report cards on surgeon-level 
volume as follows: 
                                                                                  (2) 
where k indexes surgeons, q indexes quarter of hospital admission (q = 1, … , 31; from the third 
quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2006), t indexes year of hospital admission, and j indexes 
hospital. Surgeons who have multiple admitting privileges will be treated as different 
observations. ηk is a vector of surgeon fixed effect. Skjqt  is a vector of a surgeon k at hospital j's 
observable characteristics, including experience and experience squared. Highkjq  and Lowkjq  
indicate whether the surgeon received a high or low in-hospital mortality flag in the most recent 
report card prior to performing the CABG surgery. The excluded group consists of surgeons 
whose actual in-hospital mortality rates are within the 95% confidence interval. We expect β1  to 
be negative and β2  to be positive. 
The dummy NotRatedkjq indicates whether the surgeon appears in the most recent report 
card. Due to minimum volume thresholds for reporting outcomes set by PHC4, surgeons will be 
unrated if they performed less than 30 CABG surgeries in PA in the years when the report card 
information was collected. Because surgeons who had a very low volume of CABG or newly 
entered the market will not be rated, thus, by definition, β3  should be negative. Our main interest 
is not β3; rather, we are more interested in α1, α2, β1, and β2. However, hospitals that have many 
non-rated surgeons may be rated. We will run regressions separately with and without including 
patients whose surgeries were performed by non-rated surgeons.  21 
 
Finally, to test the persistency of report card effects and capture the "news" content, we 
interact High and Low indictors with indicators for the number of years since the most recent 
report (e.g., 1 year, 2 years, 3 years and more than 3 years).  
5.2 Patients' Choice Analysis 
Unlike the volume analyses described above, the patient's choice model allows us to 
account for patients' heterogeneity, and therefore an alternative and more detailed insight into the 
matching between patient and surgeon. We use a discrete choice model to formulate a patient’s 
selection of a hospital-surgeon pair. Surgeons who have multiple admitting privileges will be 
treated as different alternatives.  Because the decision of where and from whom to have a CABG 
surgery is likely to be jointly determined by the patient and his or her cardiologist, individual 
preference or knowledge about the CABG surgery can induce correlations in choosing those 
alternatives. We model such correlations using a mixed logit model, also known as the random 
parameter (or coefficient) logit model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Hole, 2007; Train, 2009).
 23 
Using a random utility (U) model consistent with discrete choice, we specify its 






ijk V U     (s   {low, high}; j = 1, 2, …, J; k = 1, 2, …, K),    (3) 
where s denotes the severity of cardiac illness, j denotes a hospital, and k denotes a surgeon. 
Following the literature on discrete choice models, we use a linear specification for the 
representative utility 
s
ijk V (Train, 2009), which is additively separable in hospital and surgeon 
                                                 
23 We use the user-written “mixlogit” command in Stata (Hole, 2007) and estimate the mixed logit model using the 
maximum simulated likelihood method, which uses Halton draws to simulate the likelihood function. “The superior 
coverage and the negative correlation over observations that are obtained with Halton draws combine to make 
Halton draws far more effective than random draws for simulation...... Bhat (2001) found that 100 Halton draws 
provided more precise results for his mixed logit than 1000 random draws.” (Train, 2009, p.228). In the example 
given by Train (2009, p.229), 100 Halton draws gave very similar results to 1,000 Halton draws. We use 100 Halton 
draws in all our mixed logit estimations to reduce computation burden. 22 
 






ijk S H V       ,   (4) 
where 
s
ij H  is a vector of hospital j’s observable characteristics, 
s
ijk S  is a vector of surgeon k’s 
observable characteristics.  
To take into account correlations in choosing a surgeon (an alternative) but leaving the 
correlation structure in 
s
ijk   in equation (3) unspecified, we use the mixed logit model (Train, 
2009). This model assumes that the heterogeneity in a decision-maker’s preference or evaluation 
for alternatives induces the correlation in choosing alternatives. Specifically, the marginal utility 
( ) in the representative utility (
s
ijk V ) in equation (4) is modeled as a random variable as opposed 







ijk S H V
         (5) 
The idiosyncratic part of the random utility (
s
ijk  ) in equation (3) is assumed to have the type I 

































   (6) 
Note that the set of alternatives } , , 2 , 1 { K  is grouped by hospital into J subsets ( 1 B , 2 B , …, J B ) 
such that  j
J
j B K 1 } , , 2 , 1 {     . We herein follow the literature on the mixed logit model (Train, 
2009), assuming the difference between  i   and its mean   to be normally distributed. 
Specifically, we have 
. ) , (   and          0 u u N i i i     (7) 
Substituting equations (6) and (7) into equation (3), we have 23 
 












ijk S v v S H U         
 
u    (8) 
Thus, the mixed logit model takes into account any pairwise correlation between 
s
ijk U  and 
s
ijl U  (
K l k , , 2 , 1 ,   ) conditional on the hospital and surgeon level characteristics (
s
ij H  and 
s
ijk S ) 
through the following:
24 








ijk   

      (9)  
In this mixed logit model, despite that 
s
ijk   is independent across individuals ( N i , , 2 , 1   ) and 
alternatives ( K k , , 2 , 1   ), introducing the random parameters ( i  ’s) allows for correlation 
between any pair of 
s
ijk U  and 
s
ijl U  ( l k  ), in which the two surgeons are not necessarily 
affiliated with the same hospital. 
The unconditional choice probability can be obtained by integrating the conditional 
choice probability in equation (4) over a probability density function of   (with subscript i 
suppressed) parameterized by  : 
. ) | (
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g     
  
 
      (10) 
For the normal probability distribution of  ,   refers to   and     in equation (7). The mixed 
logit model obtains   estimates using the maximum simulated likelihood method (Hole, 2007; 
Train, 2009). 
Note that the unconditional choice probability specified in equation (10) is a weighted 
average of the choice-probability conditional on  , in which the weight is  ) | (   f  ― the 
probability density of   in the entire population (of patients). Using the Bayes’ rule, as shown in 
                                                 
24 If the pairwise correlation coefficient is a nonzero constant within each hospital, the mixed logit model is 
equivalent to a nested logit model.  24 
 
Train (2009), we can obtain a distribution of   at the level of each patient whose surgeon-choice 
has been observed in our sample, 
.
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s S H k y   can be estimated by maximum 





s S H k y   is specified by equation (6), and the unconditional 
density of  ,  ) | (   f , is assumed to be normal. Based on equation (11), we can obtain the 
average conditional distribution of   at each patient level as follows (Train, 2009): 
.
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  (12) 
The estimate of  i   represents the individual level (each patient’s) preference towards 
characteristics of alternatives (surgeons) in the choice set, whereas   characterizes (the moments 
of) the distribution of the preference ( ) for all patients. The former reveals information about a 
particular patient’s preference in choosing surgeons conditional on his or her decision already 
made. The latter gives the distribution of the preference in the entire population (of patients). 
It is important to note that  i  , the average preference in the conditional distribution  






ij    ), is conceptually distinct and numerically different from  , the 
average preference in the unconditional distribution ( ) | (   f ). However, the similarity between 
the average of all estimated  i  ’s across all patients in the estimation sample and the estimated 
  suggests that the mixed logit model in equation (10) is correctly specified and accurately 
estimated (Train, 2009, p.270), which serves as a specification check in our following empirical 25 
 
analyses. 
Mixed logit model offers at least two advantages over other discrete choice models such 
as a nested logit model. First, mixed logit model is arguably the most flexible way to deal with 
the problem of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) pervasive in discrete choice 
models (Train, 2009, p.134).
 Second, we can compute the individual-level average preference 
estimate specified by equation (12) to conduct a specification check for the mixed logit model.
 25 
We estimate the mixed logit model separately for each report card period after 2000.
26 In 
equation (4), the vector 
s
ij H  includes the most recent hospital report card rating (i.e. high 
mortality flag), hospital ownership type, number of beds, teaching status, the Euclidean distance 
measured between patient i’s residence zip code to hospital j’s zip code, and the distance-squared 
term. In the most inclusive specification, we include the interactions of hospital high mortality 
flag with hospital characteristics. The vector 
s
ijk S  includes a surgeon’s most recent report card 
rating, years of experience, and its squared term. In our estimation sample, all hospital-surgeon 
pairs within a 50-mile radius of a patient’s residence constitute his or her choice set.
27 
To examine the heterogeneity in the effects of report cards on a patient’s surgeon choice, 
we also estimate the mixed logit model by the patient’s severity of illness and admission type 
(emergency versus non-emergency) at the time of the surgery. In our patient-level surgeon-
choice analyses, no alternative-invariant variables, such as patient characteristics, are directly 
included into the estimation model. Conceivably, a patient’s choosing whom to perform a 
surgery can be largely explained by a surgeon’s characteristics (which are alternative-varying) as 
                                                 
25We use the user-written “mixlbeta” command in Stata (Hole, 2007) with 100 Halton draws. 
26We are not able to perform the mixed logit estimation on earlier periods because of too many nonrated surgeons, 
which make the choice set too large to implement the mixed logit estimator. 
27In our sample, the average distance measured between a patient's residence zip code and the zip code of a hospital 
included in his or her choice set is 17.7 miles, and the standard deviation is 30 miles. 26 
 
opposed to the marginal utility the patient may derive from each alternative according to his or 
her own (alternative-invariant) characteristics. Empirically, estimating the return to each 
alternative-invariant patient characteristic requires interacting it with each alternative in the 
choice set. Thus, two challenges arise if we include alternative-invariant variables into our non-
binary discrete choice models. First, the sign and the magnitude of any coefficient (and its 
marginal effect) estimate for alternative-invariant variables depend on which alternative is set to 
be the base category. The interpretation of those estimates relative to the base category will add 
to empirical ambiguity because there is no natural base category (a lone surgeon) in our 
empirical setting. Second, such an estimation procedure adds formidable challenges and 
computation burden to our high-dimensional nonlinear numerical optimization. 
Our mixed logit analyses follow the two-part procedure proposed by Train (2009, pp.280-
281). First, as specified in equation (7), we obtain the estimates of the means and standard 
deviations of the random parameters for the population. Second, we compute the means and 
standard deviations of the random parameters at each patient level conditional on our sample in 
which each patient’s actual choice (revealed preference) has been observed. As explained by 
Train (2009, p.281), there are two reasons why obtaining the patient-level conditional 
distributions is preferred to including patient’s characteristics directly into the discrete choice 
model. First, adding patient’s characteristics to the estimation equation requires that the effect to 
be additive and homogeneous across patients, which is unnecessarily restrictive. In mixed logit 
models, a patient’s evaluation or preference for each alternative, either based on alternative-
invariant or alternative-varying characteristics, is modeled as a separate random variable 
multiplied with the characteristics of each alternative. This leads to the second point in favor of 
our two-part procedure: the conditional distribution at each patient-level can reveal patterns that 27 
 
cannot be related to observed patient characteristics (Train, 2009, p.281), especially in the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneities among patients. 
6 Empirical Results 
6.1 Hospital-Level and Surgeon-Level Volume Analysis 
Table 4 presents the results of our hospital-level volume analysis. Our sample consists of 1,469 
hospital-quarters in Pennsylvania between the third quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2006. 
The first panel of Table 4 shows the results using hospital quarterly volume on all CABG cases 
as the dependent variable. We first regress quarterly volume on report card ratings while 
controlling for year fixed effects and hospital characteristics. The results suggest that being 
identified as a high-mortality hospital in the most recent report card is associated with a decline 
of 9 CABG surgeries per quarter. This decline is not statistically significant. However, being 
identified as a low-mortality hospital in the most recent report card is associated with an increase 
of 33.41 CABG surgeries per quarter, and this increase is statistically significant at the ten 
percent level. 
In our second specifications, we include hospital fixed effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity associated with hospital quality. The inclusion of hospital fixed effects 
significantly reduced the point estimates of all rating coefficients. In our final specification with 
the inclusion of both hospital characteristics and hospital fixed effects, hospitals with poor 
ratings are associated with a decrease of 5.60 CABG surgeries and ones with good ratings are 
associated with an increase of 5.13 CABG surgeries. Though coefficients are not precisely 
estimated, it is interesting to note that the overall volume effects are of similar magnitudes but in 
opposing directions, that is, patients not treated at hospitals with poor ratings will undergo 28 
 
surgery at hospitals with higher ratings. It implies that hospital report cards do not change the 
population of patients who received the CABG surgeries. 
We repeat our regressions for low-severity ((4)-(6)) and high-severity CABG cases ((7)-
(9)) in Table 4. The results show a similar pattern to the analysis of the whole volume. 
Controlling hospital fixed effects significantly reduces the magnitude of the coefficient, 
suggesting that analyses based on the cross-section data yield biased results. In the most 
inclusive specification (column (6)), being identified as a high-mortality hospital in the most 
recent report card is associated with a decline of 4.47 low-severity CABG surgeries per quarter, 
though this decline is not statistically significant. 79% of this decrease is almost entirely picked 
up by the hospitals with good ratings. We find similar results for volume on high-severity CABG 
cases; the only difference is that the coefficients are smaller (column (9)). Hospitals with poor 
ratings are associated with a decrease of 1.20 CABG surgeries per quarter, and this decrease is 
picked up by hospitals with good ratings. 
In the second model of Table 4, we interact High and Low indictors with indicators for 
the number of years since the most recent report (e.g., 1 year, 2 years, 3 years and more than 3 
years). In the most inclusive specification, hospital volumes significantly decrease two years 
after receiving a high mortality flag (column (3)), particularly the volumes on low-severity 
patients (column (6)). There are several possible explanations for this finding. First, it takes time 
for information to diffuse and volume to decline at bad hospitals. In particular, report cards were 
published every year after 2002, thus, the variations of 2-3+ years interactions only come from 
earlier report cards. It may take longer for information to diffuse in earlier periods. Second, it 
takes time for insurance companies to update their networks, and/or the fact that employers only 
really contract once a year with different insurers, and they may go toward insurers that exclude 29 
 
poor hospitals. Third, surgeons who feel they are better than average will leave bad hospitals or 
steer patients toward admission at better hospitals if they have privileges, but this cannot happen 
instantaneously.  
Overall, there are four important things to consider in light of the results of the estimation 
reported in Table 4. First, hospital report cards appear to have no significant impact on surgical 
volume at the hospital-level. Second, hospital report cards do not appear to change the 
population of patients who received CABG surgeries. Third, if we consider only the magnitude 
of the coefficients, hospital report cards have a larger impact on the distribution of healthier 
patients across hospitals, consistent with the idea that these patients have more time to gather 
information on patient quality. Fourth, bad ratings take about a year to have a negative effect 
(conditional on there being an effect), however, the effect is not persistent.  
Table 5 presents the results on surgeon-level volume analysis. We run samples with 
(columns (1)-(3)) and without (columns (4)-(6)) non-rated surgeons separately. Results from 
these two samples are very similar. Thus, we only discuss one set of the results in more detail 
below. Again, we add hospital characteristics, hospital fixed effects and surgeon fixed effects 
incrementally. The iterative introduction of each set of fixed effects reduces the magnitude of the 
coefficients relative to the previous specification. We focus on and report only the most inclusive 
specifications.  
For all CABG cases (column (1)), being identified as a high-mortality surgeon in the 
most recent report card is associated with a decline of 4.76 CABG surgeries per quarter and the 
coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Being identified as a low-mortality surgeon is 
associated with an increase of 4.63 CABG surgeries per quarter, though this coefficient is not 
precisely estimated. Surgeons with no report card, either a low-volume surgeon or a new surgeon 30 
 
in the market, perform 8.04 fewer surgeries after the release of the report cards and the 
coefficient here is also statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
We repeat our regressions for low-severity (column (2)) and high-severity CABG cases 
(column (3)). Overall, our results suggest a similar pattern to the whole volume analysis: high 
mortality (low-performing) and non-rated surgeons experience a subsequent decrease in volume. 
Surgeons with poor ratings in the most recent report card will have a CABG volume reduction of 
3.15 and 1.53 per quarter on low and high severity patients, respectively. Unrated surgeons in the 
most recent report card will have a CABG volume reduction of 5.17 and 3.69 per quarter on low 
and high severity patients, respectively. 
Again, the fact that the magnitude of the reduction is higher for low severity patients is 
consistent with the idea that healthier patients have more time to gather information before 
making a choice of surgeons. The healthier patients also can afford to wait for the better rated 
surgeon to be available. However, these results have potentially negative implications for 
patient-surgeon matching. One would arguably want the best surgeons operating on sicker 
patients. Instead, conditional upon staying in the market, a low-performing surgeon's volume of 
relatively healthier patients is decreasing more than the volume of relatively sicker patients, 
suggesting that the patient population they face after a poor rating or a non-rating is sicker than 
before the recent report cards.  Of the total reduction of volume associated with low-performing 
or unrated surgeons, 4.07 of the procedures on low severity patients appears to be captured by 
high-performing surgeons, but there is little evidence of reallocation of high severity patients to 
high-performing surgeons. 
This strengthens the assertion that report cards affect the distribution of patients across 
surgeons and therefore may not result in the improved patient-surgeon matching that is often 31 
 
cited as a potential benefit of these report cards. It also raises concerns that high severity patients 
may have a more difficult time in getting a CABG, consistent with the findings of Schneider and 
Epstein (1996) in which cardiologists reported having a tougher time placing sicker patients after 
the advent of public reporting in Pennsylvania.  
Interestingly, the surgeons with a high-mortality flag experienced persistent declines in 
volumes (Table 5, lower panel). The estimated coefficients are statistically significant and tend 
to be more negative as the time since the report increases. Similar to previous findings, volume 
reductions are larger on low-severity patients. The report cards significantly increased volume 
for those surgeons receiving low-mortality flags in the first two years following a report. The 
increases are statistically significant for low-severity patients in particular. The coefficient 
estimate is negative in subsequent years, but not statistically precise.  This finding is consistent 
with a short-term ‘bump’ in volume that occurs as a result of a good report card and eventually 
subsides due to the trend toward overall decreasing CABG volume throughout this period.   
To sum up, in our provider-volume analysis we found that CABG report cards have an 
impact on surgeon-level volume but very limited on hospital-level volume. The implication is 
that the market responds more to the surgeon rating than the hospital rating. Related to surgeon-
volume analysis, we find that surgeons with poor ratings or who are non-rated will have lower 
surgical volumes after the publication of report cards, regardless of patient severity. The impacts 
are persistent over time for poor-performing surgeons. However, 49% of the reducing volumes 
from healthier patients will be shifted to better surgeons but only 18% occurs among sicker 
patients. Overall this analysis suggests hospitals may be able to respond to poor ratings by re-
allocating the patients across surgeons within a hospital, and thus patients and referring doctors 32 
 
are less apt to avoid specific hospitals, rather they are more apt to avoid specific surgeons who 
are rated as poor or not rated at all. 
6.2 Patients’ Choice Analysis 
Having found that the market is more responsive to the surgeons' report card, we further 
study the demand-side responses to surgeons' ratings. We estimate a mixed logit model 
separately for each report card period.
 We also estimate models separately with and without non-
rated surgeons. In the aggregate analysis, the causality between non-rated and volumes is bi-
directional (i.e. non-rated will lead to lower volume, but lower volume will make surgeons non-
rated). However, from the individual patient level, choosing a surgeon may or may not make the 
surgeon nonrated.
28 Thus, the causal relationship between non-rated and patients' choice is likely 
to be one way. 
Due to space constraint, we only report results for the 2003 report card episode.
29 The 
results (in Table 6) suggest that CABG patients are less likely to choose a high-mortality surgeon 
or an unrated surgeon, these results are robust regardless of whether interactions of high 
mortality flag and other hospital variables are included (columns (3) and (4)). The coefficients of 
high mortality flag remain significantly negative after excluding non-rated surgeons (columns (2) 
and (4)).  
These results are consistent with our findings in Table 5 and suggest that someone, 
whether patients, referring physicians, health plan providers, or even hospital administrators, is 
responsive to surgeons’ ratings. Though beyond the scope of our data, further research into 
whether it is a patient in conjunction with their cardiologist, or hospital management using report 
                                                 
28 The only way an individual patient could willfully change a surgeon from non-rated to rated is if they knew they 
would be the surgeon’s 30th patient in the rating year (the threshold for getting rated) which is a highly unlikely 
scenario. 
29 Mixed logit results for other report card periods are largely similar. Those results are available upon request. 33 
 
cards to steer patients to better providers, is necessary and important to improve our 
understanding of the mechanisms through which report cards impact medical care markets. 
Our two-part estimation procedure described in Section 5.2 provides a diagnostic check 
for the mixed logit model specification. If the mixed logit model is correctly specified, then the 
means of the estimated random parameters for the unconditional distribution (in Table 6) should 
be similar to the means of the estimated random parameters at each patient level for the 
conditional distribution (in Table 7) (Train, 2009, p.270). Our mixed logit estimates from the 
population distribution (our study population including all patients; Table 6) and the conditional 
distribution (our sample in which each patient’s choice is observed; Table 7) are almost identical, 
suggesting the validity of our mixed logit model specification. 
Hospital characteristics also play significant roles in determining patients’ selection. We 
find that patients are more likely to choose teaching, nonprofit, larger and closer hospitals. Our 
result shows that patients have higher probability to go to high mortality flag hospitals, which is 
counterintuitive and inconsistent with our findings in Table 5. When we account for patients' 
heterogeneity in the mixed logit model, an important explanation of this counterintuitive result 
emerges, though.  
Related to the issues discussed in Section 5.2, to further account for patients' 
heterogeneity related to health status at the time of the procedure, we repeat our mixed logit 
estimations, stratifying the full sample by patient severity and admission type (emergency versus 
non-emergency) for each report card period. The results for the 2003 report card episode with 
interactions of high mortality flag and other hospital characteristics are summarized in Tables 8-
9.
30
 Overall, all patients, regardless of severity of illness, are less likely to choose high-mortality 
surgeons or unrated surgeons, but that hospital ratings do not play a significant role in patients' 
                                                 
30 Mixed logit results for other report card periods are largely similar. Those results are available upon request. 34 
 
choices (Table 8). In Table 9, both non-emergency and emergency patients are less likely to 
choose high-mortality surgeons, but the former are more responsive to the poor rating of 
surgeons. Hospital's high mortality flag is not statistically significant for the non-emergency 
patients. However, these coefficients are significantly positive for emergency patients. These 
results suggest that the positive coefficients of HMF that we see in Table 6 are largely driven by 
patients with emergent care needs. These patients might select (or be routed to) "bad" hospitals, 
because they are located much closer than any other hospital, due to the nature of the optimal 
treatments for the underlying disease for which one receives CABG.  However, conditional upon 
being at a bad hospital they are still routed away from "bad" surgeons.
31 
So far we only focus on the signs of coefficients, but the question now becomes how to 
interpret the magnitude of these coefficients. In our mixed logit model, for the variables with 
standard deviation estimates of the associated coefficients statistically significant from zero, we 
can obtain the information about the distribution of patient preferences or evaluations for 
surgeon characteristics.
 Take the results without nonrated surgeons as an example (Table 6, (4)). 
Our results suggest that 94%
32 of patients choose experienced surgeons and 93%
33 patients 
would avoid surgeons with high mortality flag.
34 For nonemergency patients (Table 9, (1)), 92% 
choose experienced surgeons, 90% avoid low-rated surgeons and 80%
35 avoid non-rated 
surgeons. Taken all results together, 90%-94% patients avoid having a surgery performed by a 
                                                 
31 If a patient is suffering an AMI, which is often the event that leads to CABG, time to reperfusion is an important 
predictor of the outcome of treatment, thus there would be a tension between getting to a ‘better’ hospital and 
minimizing the time to treatment.  
32 This figure is given by  ) / ( k k s b  , where  is the cumulative standard normal distribution,  k b  and  k s  are the 
mean and the standard deviation, respectively,  k denotes the years of experience. 
33 This figure is given by  ) / ( k k s b   , where  is the cumulative standard normal distribution,  k b  and  k s  are 
the mean and the standard deviation, respectively, k denotes a surgeon with a high-mortality flag. 
34 We calculate the figures for all variables that have statistically significant standard deviations. Results are 
available upon request. 
35 This figure is given by  ) / ( k k s b   , where  is the cumulative standard normal distribution,  k b  and  k s are the 
mean and the standard deviation, respectively, k denotes a nonrated surgeon. 35 
 
poorly rated surgeon. 
Another way to explain our coefficients is to use an equivalence-type interpretation of 
our mixed logit estimates (Train, 2009, p.272). For example, we find that a surgeon having 
received a high mortality flag is perceived by a patient as having approximately 17 years less 
experience (Table 6, (1)). Furthermore, our results suggest that this figure in a comparable 
setting (i.e. the most inclusive specification) ranges from 15 years (high severity patients) to 34 
years (nonemergency patients).  
7 Conclusion 
Report cards publicly disclose information on the performance of healthcare providers, as 
measured by patient health outcomes. The intent of mandating public reporting is to improve the 
quality and efficiency of medical care, thus improving social welfare. In this paper we 
investigate what impacts public reporting of provider performance have had within the market 
for CABG's in Pennsylvania, and whether there is evidence of improved social welfare. 
Our analyses of the impacts of public information on provider volume are done at both the 
hospital level and at the surgeon level, as public information may have different impacts for 
these two groups. Indeed we find that public reporting led to a decrease in volume for unrated 
and poor performing surgeons, but interestingly, the volume of the high performing surgeons 
does not increase by an offsetting amount.  In addition, we do not find a statistically significant 
effect on hospital volume once we control for unobserved heterogeneity, which is in contrast to 
findings of Cutler et al. (2004). These findings persist when we analyze the impacts by patient 
severity.  
Subsequent the volume impact, we investigate the matching between patients and 
providers. Results of our patient choice modeling suggest that public reporting leads to poor 36 
 
performing or unrated surgeon avoidance. This model demonstrates that distance to the hospital 
is likely a more relevant factor in the choice of hospital than the rating it received, but 
conditional upon being admitted to the hospital the patients sort to better rated surgeons. The 
mechanism of exactly whether this low performing surgeon avoidance behavior is patient 
preference driven, referring doctor driven, or somehow due to hospital management decisions is 
left to future research. 
The main question related to the impact of publicly provided healthcare provider report 
cards is whether they improve the market. If report cards accurately reflect the quality of 
healthcare provider, welfare improvement can be achieved through enhanced information 
symmetry between patients and healthcare providers and reduced search costs for patients who 
value high quality. However, report cards raise the stakes for a physician performing a surgery 
on a high risk patient.  Receiving a high-mortality flag could be perceived by a patient as the 
surgeon having 10-20 fewer years of experience, affecting the demand for their services. In this 
sense, report cards could potentially lead to crowding of higher quality surgeons (or other 
healthcare providers) for higher risk patients, either because of surgeons’ unwillingness to 
operate on the patient or because the healthier patients are using the report card information to 
select better providers. Given the last point, the net welfare gain can be ambiguous.  Further 
research is needed to assess the degree to which report cards affect total welfare, as well as 
examining the mechanisms by which the report cards lead to the sorting and avoidance behavior 
we have noted here.   37 
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Table 1: Cardiac Surgery Report Card Data Collection and Publication Dates in 
Pennsylvania 
Publication  Data Collection Period  Online Publication 
Year Quarter 
1992 4th  1990  No 
1993 4th  1991  No 
1994 4th  1992  No 
1995 2nd  1993  No 
1998 2nd  1994-1995  Yes 
2002 2nd  2000  Yes 
2004 1st  2002  Yes 
2005 1st  2003  Yes 
2006 1st  2004  Yes 






Table 2: Number of Hospitals and Surgeons by Ratings 
Year in which data was collected 1994/1995 2000 2002  2003
Number of Hospitals by Hospital Ratings
High-mortality flag  4 4 7  3
Low-mortality flag  3 3 2  1
Same-as-expected mortality flag 35 48 50  55
Total number of hospitals 42 55 59  59
Number of Surgeons by Surgeon Ratings
High-mortality flag  13 7 9  5
Low-mortality flag  5 2 0  0
Same-as-expected mortality flag 112 120 125  117
Not-rated surgeon  388 173 104  99
Total number of surgeons 518 302 238  221
Release Year/Quarter  1998/2 2002/2 2004/1  2005/1
















Table 3: Sample Statistics 
        
   All Sample 
Excluding Unrated 
Surgeons 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Death 0.024  0.153  0.021  0.144 
Hospital Ratings 
   High mortality flag  0.072  0.258  0.069  0.253 
   Low mortality flag  0.097  0.296  0.097  0.296 
   Same-as-expected mortality flag  0.831  0.375  0.834  0.372 
Surgeon Ratings 
   High mortality flag  0.037  0.190  0.055  0.227 
   Low mortality flag  0.020  0.139  0.032  0.177 
   Same-as-expected mortality flag  0.664  0.472  0.913  0.282 
   Not rated  0.279  0.449       
Sample Size  114039  84235 43 
 
Table 4: Regression of Quarterly CABG Volume on Publically Reported Mortality Flag at Hospital Level  
 
 
Notes: Sample size is 1469. Standard deviations are in brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered by hospital. Hospital 
characteristics include a dummy indicating not-for-profit status, bed size and a dummy indicating teaching status. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level for a two-tail test.
Dep. Variable =
Hospital Quarterly Volume (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mean [Std. Dev] of Dep. Var 76.5 [51.3] 45.5 [30.3] 30.3 [23.4]
Model 1
High Mortality Flag (HMF) -9.112 -5.098 -5.600 -6.162 -4.120 -4.477 -2.694 -0.471 -1.195
(14.508) (5.275) (5.25) (7.936) (3.596) (3.542) (6.785) (0.835) (2.077)
Low Mortality Flag (LMF) 33.413* 6.341 5.125 18.494* 4.669 3.55 15.068 1.436 1.578
(19.594) (9.547) (9.286) (10.053) (6.714) (6.168) (10.027) (0.734) (4.394)
Model 2
1 year since HMF ‐10.073 ‐5.001 ‐5.607 ‐6.019 ‐3.488 ‐3.884 ‐3.958 ‐1.301 ‐1.845
(10.547) (4.829) (4.583) (5.826) (3.817) (3.624) (4.857) (1.471) (1.363)
2 year since HMF ‐16.864 ‐14.892*** ‐15.510** ‐11.459 ‐10.900*** ‐11.171** ‐4.662 ‐3.149 ‐4.175
(14.421) (5.588) (6.021) (6.951) (3.817) (4.345) (7.810) (3.335) (2.953)
3 year since HMF ‐0.436 6.629 6.209 ‐0.035 4.182 3.928 0.205 2.668 2.084
(33.133) (8.342) (7.942) (19.433) (5.253) (5.033) (14.118) (3.352) (3.024)
3+ year since HMF 4.109 6.588 5.984 ‐2.362 ‐0.704 ‐1.452 6.351 6.78 7.319
(41.672) (12.649) (13.171) (24.539) (7.557) (7.974) (17.767) (5.528) (5.868)
1 year since LMF 33.289* ‐3.848 ‐5.176 17.587** ‐1.35 ‐2.634 15.976* ‐2.665 ‐2.489
(17.307) (7.683) (8.091) (8.306) (5.310) (5.327) (9.506) (4.607) (4.711)
2 year since LMF 37.749* 19.734 18.695 19.489* 11.128 10.178 18.353* 8.543 8.517
(20.647) (16.115) (14.827) (10.949) (10.685) (9.129) (10.214) (6.604) (6.659)
3 year since LMF 37.674 18.351* 17.891* 26.982 16.611** 16.169* 11.161 2.04 2.096
(30.095) (9.995) (10.415) (17.476) (8.302) (8.623) (13.368) (2.795) (2.897)
3+ year since LMF 22.246 2.56 0.826 11.068 0.642 ‐0.935 10.746 1.318 1.235
(25.086) (7.062) (7.660) (13.545) (4.444) (4.828) (12.187) (3.547) (3.650)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Hospital Chracteristics Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Low‐Severity CABG Cases High‐Severity CABG Cases All CABG Cases44 
 
Table 5: Regression of Quarterly CABG Volume on Publically Reported Mortality Flag at Surgeon Level 
 
 
Notes: Sample size is 1469. Standard deviations are in brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. All standard 
errors are clustered by surgeon. Hospital characteristics include a dummy indicating not-for-profit status, bed size 
and a dummy indicating teaching status. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level for a two-tail test.
Dep. Variable = 
Surgeon Quarterly Volume All Low‐Severity High‐Severity All Low‐Severity High‐Severity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
n=6586 n=6586 n=6586 n=4338 n=4338 n=4338
Mean of the Dep. Var 21.9 13.0 8.7 25.1 14.8 10.1
[Std. Dev. Of the Dep. Var] [14.9] [9.3] [6.8] [13.83] [8.58] [6.75]
Model 1
High Mortality Flag -4.762*** -3.147*** -1.527** -7.911*** -4.946*** -2.872***
(1.407) (0.845) (0.679) (2.013) (1.311) (0.779)
Low Mortality Flag 4.634 4.076** 0.921 3.288 2.835** 0.578
(3.79) (1.71) (1.865) (2.747) (1.375) (1.417)
Not Rated -8.042*** -5.168*** -3.695***
(1.163) (0.675) (0.524)
Model 2
1 year since High -3.371*** -2.165*** -1.095** -4.184*** -2.508*** -1.466***
(0.892) (0.589) (0.450) (0.888) (0.595) (0.474)
2 year since High -5.987*** -4.547*** -1.280** -5.323*** -4.051*** -1.052*
(1.237) (0.819) (0.627) (1.174) (0.790) (0.630)
3 year since High -8.789*** -5.253*** -3.504*** -7.327*** -4.234*** -2.885***
(1.586) (1.054) (0.810) (1.492) (1.007) (0.804)
3+ year since High -6.573*** -3.867*** -2.759*** -5.957*** -3.503*** -2.317**
(1.865) (1.243) (0.957) (1.716) (1.161) (0.928)
1 year since Low 8.167*** 7.169*** 1.509 4.708** 5.460*** -0.377
(2.074) (1.355) (1.026) (1.935) (1.295) (1.030)
2 year since Low 5.341** 3.171** 2.440** 2.39 1.695 0.881
(2.119) (1.399) (1.068) (1.951) (1.314) (1.048)
3 year since Low -0.307 2.541 -2.510* -1.557 1.9 -3.103**
(2.697) (1.781) (1.361) (2.470) (1.664) (1.328)
3+ year since Low -2.32 -1.044 -1.018 -3.628 -1.827 -1.546
(2.789) (1.845) (1.412) (2.549) (1.719) (1.372)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital Chracteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Surgeon Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample with Non‐rated Surgeons Sample without Non‐rated Surgeons45 
 




Notes: Estimation is based on patient-level data. Samples include nonrated surgeons under odd-numbered columns 
and exclude nonrated surgeons under even-numbered columns. The number of observations is the number of 
patient-alternative pairs. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level for 
a two-tailed test. 
  
Year in which data were collected
Period the report is matched to
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Surgeon characteristics
High mortality flag
  Mean -1.404*** -2.043*** -1.442*** -2.068***
(0.321) (0.508) (0.436) (0.503)
  Standard deviation 0.315 1.337** 0.481 1.381**
(1.269) (0.572) (1.168) (0.553)
Experience
  Mean 0.085*** 0.234*** 0.087*** 0.236***
(0.013) (0.029) (0.014) (0.029)
  Standard deviation 0.064*** 0.155*** 0.065*** 0.156***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
Experience squared
  Mean -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.007***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
  Standard deviation 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Not rated
  Mean -0.845*** -0.857***
(0.124) (0.138)
  Standard deviation 0.896*** 0.935***
(0.243) (0.260)
Hospital characteristics
High mortality flag (HMF) 0.438*** 0.522*** 1.047** 1.101**
(0.069) (0.076) (0.461) (0.506)
Teaching 0.257*** 0.433*** 0.288*** 0.453***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040)
Nonprofit 0.576*** 0.674*** 0.587*** 0.681***
(0.084) (0.090) (0.085) (0.090)
Number of beds 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance -0.374*** -0.378*** -0.377*** -0.381***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Distance squared 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HMF x Teaching -0.548*** -0.450**
(0.188) (0.203)
HMF x Number of beds -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
HMF x Distance 0.014 0.022
(0.019) (0.021)
HMF x Distance squared -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)




Table 7: Averages of Patient-Level Random Parameter Estimates 
 
Year in which data were 
collected  2003
Period the report is matched to  2005/2 - 2006/1
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Surgeon characteristics 
High mortality flag 
  Mean  -1.404 -2.042 -1.442 -2.068 
  Standard deviation  0.015 0.182 0.030 0.192 
Experience 
  Mean  0.085 0.234 0.087 0.236 
  Standard deviation  0.025 0.094 0.025 0.095 
Experience squared 
  Mean  -0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -0.007 
  Standard deviation  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Not rated 
  Mean  -0.844 -0.857
  Standard deviation  0.227 0.245
Number of patients  9,476 8,245 9,476 8,245 
 
Notes: Estimates for the conditional distribution are calculated based on the associated mixed logit estimates for the 
population distribution. Samples include nonrated surgeons under odd-numbered columns and exclude nonrated 








Notes: Estimation is based on patient-level data. Samples include nonrated surgeons under odd-numbered columns 
and exclude nonrated surgeons under even-numbered columns. The number of observations is the number of 
patient-alternative pairs. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level for 
a two-tailed test. 
Year in which data were collected
Period the report is matched to
Patient severity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Surgeon characteristics
High mortality flag
  Mean -2.043*** -2.315*** -1.359*** -2.662***
(0.576) (0.645) (0.148) (0.656)
  Standard deviation 1.381** 1.658*** 0.058 1.908***
(0.585) (0.587) (1.083) (0.553)
Experience
  Mean 0.084*** 0.218*** 0.091*** 0.240***
(0.019) (0.042) (0.019) (0.037)
  Standard deviation 0.061*** 0.140*** 0.069*** 0.160***
(0.019) (0.025) (0.019) (0.022)
Experience squared
  Mean -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  Standard deviation 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Not rated
  Mean -1.214*** -0.676***
(0.224) (0.136)
  Standard deviation 1.465*** 0.538
(0.309) (0.419)
Hospital characteristics
High mortality flag (HMF) 1.065* 1.037 0.994 1.235
(0.623) (0.677) (0.693) (0.771)
Teaching 0.190*** 0.311*** 0.430*** 0.650***
(0.050) (0.053) (0.057) (0.062)
Nonprofit 0.321*** 0.394*** 1.013*** 1.140***
(0.105) (0.110) (0.147) (0.158)
Number of beds 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance -0.359*** -0.362*** -0.405*** -0.408***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Distance squared 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HMF x Teaching -0.647** -0.499* -0.501* -0.468
(0.265) (0.282) (0.273) (0.297)
HMF x Number of beds -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HMF x Distance 0.029 0.049* 0.008 -0.004
(0.025) (0.027) (0.029) (0.033)
HMF x Distance squared -0.001 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of observations 290,067 205,302 233,945 161,852
2003
2005/2 - 2006/1
Low Severity High Severity48 
 




Notes: Estimation is based on patient-level data. Samples include nonrated surgeons under odd-numbered columns 
and exclude nonrated surgeons under even-numbered columns. The number of observations is the number of 
patient-alternative pairs. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level for 
a two-tailed test. 
Year in which data were collected
Period the report is matched to
Patient severity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Surgeon characteristics
High mortality flag
  Mean -2.945*** -3.262*** -1.416*** -1.558***
(0.739) (0.752) (0.198) (0.229)
  Standard deviation 2.328*** 2.645*** 0.063 0.001
(0.543) (0.541) (0.595) (0.635)
Experience
  Mean 0.086*** 0.232*** 0.075*** 0.168***
(0.018) (0.033) (0.025) (0.045)
  Standard deviation 0.062*** 0.148*** 0.055** 0.141***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.027) (0.029)
Experience squared
  Mean -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
  Standard deviation 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Not rated
  Mean -1.294*** -0.794***
(0.236) (0.180)
  Standard deviation 1.567*** 0.920***
(0.313) (0.357)
Hospital characteristics
High mortality flag (HMF) 0.453 0.459 7.203*** 7.675***
(0.563) (0.612) (2.428) (2.632)
Teaching 0.288*** 0.424*** 0.243*** 0.447***
(0.051) (0.055) (0.079) (0.085)
Nonprofit 0.454*** 0.541*** 0.844*** 0.880***
(0.114) (0.121) (0.184) (0.194)
Number of beds 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance -0.350*** -0.353*** -0.433*** -0.435***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015)
Distance squared 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HMF x Teaching -0.508** -0.404 -2.518*** -2.625**
(0.231) (0.248) (0.970) (1.045)
HMF x Number of beds -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
HMF x Distance 0.044* 0.055** -0.099 -0.099
(0.023) (0.025) (0.102) (0.108)
HMF x Distance squared -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
Number of observations 259,990 183,716 129,470 89,468
2003
2005/2 - 2006/1
Nonemergency Emergency